The Great Elephant

A Treatise on Valid Cognition

By Gendun Chophel, Earnest Priest (1903-1951)

Māra's clanging weapons you received as flowers, gentle, soft
Devadatta's wrathf'ly hurled stone you took through yogic quietude
Śākya's son, you couldn't cast an evil eye on any of your enemies
Renowned guard 'midst this fearsome world of foes, Knowing One, you are revered!

Earnest virtue, peaceful and cool, immortality's ambrosia, the liberating path
Priest the one with worldly eye to illustrate these unmistaken finer points
Lord of Law who's lion's roar, most supreme, says it like it is
Scholar's smarts unveil all sorts of reason, ever paying respect.

All Good within the expanse of space, sun of the solar system 
Born and bred our lesser knowledge within your garden's lotus heart
Steeped in rays of reason, thousandfold swirls of exegeses, on a glorious pollen bed
Three Worlds' wizened bees come revel in our honey, sweet lineage in fact!

Each of us have made a definitive decision regarding what exists or not and all the while the evidence was based solely on each our own minds. No other source could be so decisive. Here is the reason: if one were to ask, "Does this exist or not," and receive the response, "Yes, right there," what one is truly asking would be, "Does this appear to exist according to your very own experience," and so the reply would be conveyed, "Yes, this appears to exist according to my very own experience." Whether something is politically correct or offensive, good or bad, beautiful or not, the answer to any potential question can only be understood according to the supposed truth of an external source; since that source has already made up its mind, then that's the reply you get. The truth according to any given mind arises in accord with its own decision-making process. There is no other reason at all. Thus two people can size each other up and come to a consensus, or they can disagree and begin a controversy. When they both agree the truth of their specific argument is established and enters the rank of an existential and valid object of knowledge. Similarly, when that consensus is substantiated by many other wise people, then that point becomes an ideology and gains great momentum. But when there is disagreement on any given view, then that view is labeled erroneous, delusional, and the like.

This mode of consensus is occasionally based on a mutual source of scriptural transmission as well. For example: two Muslims were arguing on the final point of whether or not they were permitted to eat camel meat. When they both saw that within the Qur'an the consumption of camel is permitted, they both agreed because of the higher source that permitted it. Then again, sometimes a dispute arises between two wise people and it is resolved through reason. For example: an argument arose regarding whether or not there was a fire on the other side of a hill. Since the two had reached a consensus at first on having seen smoke on the other side, and since they were both powerfully convinced of their own, direct perception, their dispute was settled (since everybody knows that where there's smoke there's fire).

One might think that settling on a system of objects of knowledge is inevitable and place their trust within a basis through which everybody can reach consensus, but that isn't right either. For example: if one were to enter the realm of a country in which the eyes of everyone were afflicted with jaundice, where the appearance of a white conch appeared to every person as yellow, then the consensus would be that there is no such thing as white, that a white conch is yellow; but that is an inadmissible position. Therefore when there are a hundred people who agree on what's true it is difficult to decide on a middle ground, and when a thousand, or ten thousand come to consensus—well, try cutting through that! So, when everybody and their mother agrees there is no middle ground; when all beings of the three realms come to consensus—you get the point. So when we draw a line and decide what is or is not, everybody draws that line according to each their own experiential mode of reasoning. Similarly, when tradition appears to be mutually congruent with intellect, then each person joins the ranks of so many hundreds and thousands and the truth of the line they draw becomes foundational and unchangeable. If anyone were to offer a position that spoke contrarywise then such an opposing view would be broadcast as nihilistic and thoroughly belittled. 

Our statements regarding the existence or non-existence of things are in fact only based on a class of intellectual, surface-level experiences. Statements like "not" or "impossible" are based on a class of intellectual experience that is incapable of rising from below the surface-level. The phenomenal nature that neither exists nor not exists is not a member of the former [surface level], but of the latter [depths].

Candrakīrti related an amazing example of how the view of the majority falsely dismisses that of the minority. Citing a couplet from Four Hundred:

Thus I wonder if appropriate
To call the whole world insane?¹

Candrakīrti comments:

In an ancient country there was a master prognosticator. One day, having come to the court of the king he said, "In seven days a rain will fall that will make everyone who drinks it mad." So the king, having heard the prognostication, proceeded to seal the well of his drinking water to prevent it from contamination by the rain. The folk, on the other hand, were unable to do anything about it and all of them, having drunk the water, went mad—the king was the only one to maintain his original mind. Since all the people of that country had a manner of thinking and expression that now ran contrary to the thought and expression of the king, they all called him crazy. As the king was helpless to their denigrations he eventually drank the water and became just like everyone else.²

That's what he said.

That being the case, since beginningless time we have drunk the maddening water of ignorance. And without any credibility whatsoever this singlemost maddest of drinks has continually drawn such lines between existence and non-existence, yea and nay. Whether the crazies come to a consensus of one hundred, one thousand, ten thousand, or one hundred thousand, there is still no reason to go along with majority rule.

Some have been pressured to accept that there is no way for the intellect to make such decisions even though they still believe that they are undeceived by following those decisions set forth by Buddha himself. But who decides whether Buddha was right? "Well, Nagārjuna could not have been mistaken, and the same goes for the rest of the great masters who toed his line." But who knows whether Nagārjuna was right? "Well, the kindly command of my peerless and holy Highness said so." But if you depend upon your holy Highness to say what's right then it's still your own intellect making the decision. It's like saying that the tiger was judge of a lion, that the judge of the tiger was a yak, that the judge of the yak was a dog, that the judge of the dog was a mouse, and that an insect, who judged the mouse, was duly placed upon your crown as the ultimate judge of them all! That being the case, in the moment of the line being drawn regarding the ultimate basis of a definitive decision there is nothing apart from the intellectual mind itself—there is nothing else whatsoever that appears.

If one's own intellect is making the final decision, then to believe in this mind's trustworthyness is also incorrect. Each person's intellect is occasionally mistaken just the same as it is sometimes correct. If even the divinations of a halfway decent oracle are usually wrong, who would rely on their own fleeting experiences and accomplishments? What so many decided was correct in the morning turns out to be incorrect by afternoon. The decisions made early in life turn out to be false in old age when another decision has taken its place. When one hundred thousand and one Muslims have decided on their idea of the truth there are one hundred thousand and one Buddhists to decide they are wrong. Though each individual is yet unable to refine their own idea of scripture and reasoning into a diamond, they do it anyway—they place their trust on those grounds alone.

But there must be somebody with the truth who is able to make a definitive decision! If a mere majority opinion cannot provide the final say then one might reply: "Surely we can decide through the gate of valid cognition!" But what is that which we call valid cognition? The eye that sees the pillar stark is established by valid cognition, and the intellect through which it sees is also valid, right? If yes, then that intellect must decide that it is undeceived. The pillar existing or not is decided by the intellect, but there is no way to know whether or not that intellect is valid. Since one cannot know whether a pillar exists or not based on the decision made by an intellect that may or may not be valid, then when will it ever be decided?

The reason a pillar exists rests on the eye's perception and tactile sensation. One also thinks it exists because their friend also looked to see and came up with the very same reasons that their eyes and hands were in agreement. That consensus of a friend notwithstanding, the decision is still erroneous.  How can they trust their own consciousness? This all depends on whether the eye is deluded or sane. Same goes for the hand. And who is there to reason with the two friends about their delusional shared sense of reality? If they both had a bile disease then their eyes would see yellow rather than white. Even if their hands stayed the same, the fact that they both saw yellow makes their consensus null and void. Strictly speaking: aren't they all wrong about everything?

There is no need, therefore, to make a hundred classifications about what exists or not. Even if we were to classify it all, what we get along with them are pompous legends of Buddha, Nagārjuna, and the Great Charioteers. Once one finally meets Buddha, Nagārjuna, and the Great Charioteers: that is when a decision can be made through one's own intellect, an intellect void of deception. Are there any such experts who do not accept things based on hearsay? Now wouldn't it appear that the root of it all is rotten?

Therefore, though it's true that there are no other means whatsoever through which decisions can be made in dependence on this mind that has no intellectual basis at all (that mind which makes all of its decisions about the world while abiding in the realm of cyclic existence itself); nevertheless, that same mind constructs the nature of ultimate reality that is the mode of transcendence from said world with freedom from labels and transcendence of thought in the tradition of common sense. With terms like these, would it seem this decision making process has gone a bit overboard?

Given that phenomena are total fictions, and that the nature itself is fiction, and that the source of these fictions are one's own intellect that hits rock bottom through making such worthless decisions; still, even with the pure diligence and heart to seek out the ultimate truth, this fictional, albeit expert mind could not go very far. This must be well understood from the beginning.

In brief, if there is a reasonable explanation that shows proof that this intellect of ours is unmistaken, and undeceived, then it would indeed be possible to posit a variety of things unmistaken and undeceived. Could there be anything of greater consequence than the challenge to show proof of an unmistaken intellect? As Candrakīrti says in Commentary on the Entrance, "What is the use of a truth being true on its own account?"³ But even this statement has not been accepted as truth since it is also said, "The reason for that which is unmistaken is because it is unmistaken." The greatest challenge, then, is to show how something can be unmistaken.

Why is it necessary to say that a common fool is deluded in the mind? Reverend Buddhaghoṣa drew the line to establish the conventional truth then Master Asaṅga dismissed it as false. What's more, according to Asaṅga himself, what's a totally conceptualized characteristic is false, while those things that are out of our control are true. Since the masters of Middle Way have dismissed these categorizations as falsehoods, and if there is no support for the mind with regard to the thought of these experts, in whose ideas can we place our trust? Even to a person who is just like us, I would point out:

From youth to decrepit old age
I've followed this very approach of mind
Were I to analyze experience
Why trust mind as it rises today?

Well, if there is no place for this intellectual mind to place its trust, one might ask, "What can we do about it?" Like I said before: whatever exists in the world must abide in existential fiction, the intellect's focus being falsehood. Where else do we stand besides making all sorts of claims on top of that?

And yet, whatever we see today—be it earth, stones, mountains, or crags—it is extremely mistaken to think that they would still look the same to a buddha, only more vivid. While a donkey is able to experience the delicious flavor of grass while consciousness abides in its body it's over and done with when the donkey is dead. A bird, moreover, has its own learned behaviors that are specific to its form, and those too are over and done with upon its passing. And with regard to ourselves, if we had more than five senses, of course our external objects of knowledge would all be enriched. If our two eyes were stacked top and bottom rather than left and right, then the shapes and colors of all external forms would be discerned differently than they are now. Whatever we decide is based on these five senses: there are no other means at all to make any other decision. If we could not see from within these two eyes in our forehead there would be no other way to see. If sound could not be contained within the little drums of our ears we would not be able to hear. And the same goes for the rest of the senses. Therefore these five senses are feeble and, on top of that, complicit in delusional mind so that having decided, "All objects of knowledge are compounded," still the real meaning does not dawn on the face of one's own mind. To call it non-existent, or impossible, is pleasing; yet calling it anything is the door through which all troubles come to a head.

The validity of these senses of ours should be seen in the context of what the Conqueror himself so clearly taught in King of Concentration:

Invalid are the eye, the ear, the nose
Invalid are the tongue, body, and mind.
If valid the senses were as they seem
What use would there be for the Noble Path?⁴

It's exactly like he said.

Therefore, meditation on the path of Noble Ones is the ultimate entrance to the truth. In case it had not previously dawned to the mind, a new way of understanding would be that the eye simply cannot see. And yet we accept the world as it is based on hearsay, being manipulated by compounding phenomena—all of which takes place at the moment the tiniest label is applied. Human beings themselves, being in and of the world, are obscured by conditions that they alone have constructed. For example, since our idea of joy is conditioned on precious jewels we have the grounds and households of None Higher itself constructed of nothing but precious jewels. Similarly, the excellent characteristics of the rising enjoyment form are based on nothing other than the fashion that is pleasing to our eyes.

All the minute designations of rising enjoyment are understood to be based on the fashion of the Indian kings of yore who were themselves fashioned after their own divinities. This is meant to show that, at the surface level of mind, those qualities of Buddha and his environs that cannot actually be seen are rather generated in the vivid and proliferate detail familiar to our mind in the first place. Thus are the skillful means of Scripture. For example, if Buddha were fashioned according to Chinese sensibilities: the rising enjoyment forms of None Higher would definitely have long, oily goatees, they'd all be flanked by dragons and dressed in golden cloaks. Similarly, if Buddha were dressed by Tibetans: None Higher would feature golden tea churns some five hundred leagues high filled with butter from wish-fulfilling cows and tea made from leaves of the wish-fulfilling tree—this is without a doubt! Therefore all of these things are born of each our own respective manners of thought. As for the way in which the realm of rising enjoyment manifests to Buddha, Candrakīrti said: "Well, this is your secret, and it would be disrespectful of me to divulge."⁵ That's what he said. It is unfitting to be spoken of in our presence; and even if it were it would certainly be misunderstood. Were one to have just a little bit of faith in the realm of the inconceivable secret of Buddha, then one must be able to open their mind to all Buddha's activities, including the equalization of an eon with an instant, and the equalization of an atomic particle with that of the entire world.⁶

Were we to set our intellectual minds on what's valid the absolutely smallest form would be the atomic particle and the absolutely largest domain would be the entire world. If one were to have decided that something so big can't fit into something so small, then how does one account via valid cognition Buddha's ability to perform such a great miracle? Suppose that if he could, Buddha would also have the ability to transform the conventional truths of all phenomena. Suppose he would have the power to transform a sentient being into a buddha! But if there is no reasonable explanation for a sentient being becoming a buddha or, for that matter, a truth that applies to all phenomena, then is there no way for anything else to change? Suppose we were to say that there is nothing big or small about an atomic particle, or the world, then that would belittle conventional reality and lead to the view of nihilism. When Buddha acted without any regard toward the big or small, then is there any greater sin in claiming that it was nihilistic for him to have taken both in the palm of his hand? Generally, having decided that an atomic particle and the entire world are greater and lesser in size, then one may say that the deeds of Buddha are a special case. Indeed though, the necessity of having to make so many exceptions surely pricks some holes in the meaning that is our bag of validities—that bag that is supposed to account for it all.

In order to fully understand Buddha's equalization of the large and small—the particle and the world—the reason is not so much that he has some extraordinary power to make what is unequal equal. Rather our apparently contradictory and discursive perceptions of large and small, at the surface level of intellect, is to be seen as the decisive factor: for Buddha's mind is non-dual, gnostic by nature, and impossible to be bound by such reasoning. The large and small are one and the same in Buddha's eyes, and both being equal in reality is the operating principle that, in resisting such labels, is actually transformational. What else could explain his miracles?

Regarding our conceptualizations of what exists or not—what's large or small, good or bad—since all of it is mutually contradictory there is no way the world could fit within an atom. Our designations of what's valid, being totally fabricated in their own right, is what make the manifestation of miracles so great! So it is necessary to understand that it is we who are performing the miracles here, not Buddha.

In the colophon to The Entrance it is said that Master Candrakīrti "reversed attachment to ideas of truth in many ways, including having obtained milk from the painting of a cow."⁷ If this were a valid assertion, and if it were the case that there were no guts—lungs, udders, and the like—in the painting of the cow; if it were the case that actual milk was produced, then Candrakīrti would have done a great disservice to Essence of Correlative Arising. How could anyone reverse that truth?

As it is said by Lord Atiśa in The Book of Scriptural Advisors:

Our body has been placed within the little mold of a perfectly complete Buddha. That and various other miracles are my teaching on liberation. For a long time everything that we've done will be understood by the logicians as contradictory and expressed as such. Well, if that's how they reckon, let them reckon so! They will say things like, "It's not at all like this in actuality." So I traverse India and Tibet to convey such legends only to have them broken down again.⁸

Therefore we reason: if something is not non-existent, then must it exist? If something is not in existence, then must it not exist? The reality of both is a contradiction. And there being neither, everything would be impossible! Similarly, what is small cannot be large, and what is large cannot be small, and that if both are indistinguishable then all the principles of correlative arising will have been debunked! Regarding such expressions as, "The view of reality as that which is free from eight extremes is a terrible form of nihilism," is to say that apart from existence and non-existence there is nothing that can arise in our minds. Since our surface-level minds do not know anything other than existence and non-existence, how can it be established that there is nothing, that it's all impossible, when the reasons themselves are unable to dawn in our minds?

For example: say we arrive in a locale of the Northern Plains where, apart from milk, no other sweet had ever been tasted. There the folk would have naturally to come to the conclusion, "If it's sweet, it must be milk: if it's not milk, then it must not be sweet." If there was no no milk in the vicinity, but also a sweet: that would be a direct and ultimate contradiction to which it would be wise to express that a great case of nihilism was debunked as totofiction. And here's another similar example: if both Victor and Longlife are the only two people a person has ever known, then the decision to be made when one person or another enters the house is, "If it's not Victor, then now I must decide it's Longlife. Since I don't have any reason to recognize any other person apart from these two, then if it's not one, it must be the other." Such conclusions are compelled by conditions in the very same way.

The truth is that our minds take a thing and make it exist or not and, on top of that, we go back and forth between the two without ever settling in any place. And yet there are no means other than abiding in duality where anything whatsoever is not what is seems.

However, the path of Middle Way expressed as "that which is at the center of both existence and non-existence," has been clearly expressed by Buddha himself. For example, from The Kaśyapa Chapter, he says:

Kaśyapa, what we call "existence" makes one extreme, and what we call "non-existence" makes two extremes. That which is at the center of both of them, be it expressed as the path of the Middle Way, is nothing at all. It is inconceivable.⁹

Also, from Noble Jewel Heap:

Debating over existence or non-'s
The same debate as whether clean or not
Debates don't pacify any suffering
And yet to not debate is suffering's extreme¹⁰

That and more has been very clearly expressed. However when the learned ones of our day catch wind of the words "does not exist" or "does not not exist" the first thing they do is ask, "Who is the master would speak such a thing?" And they make their case for a debate. If it were the words of a scholar of old Tibet, they respond in kind, saying, "That master is a nihilist, an idiot," and bully him around. On the other hand, if they were to recognize that they've come face to face with the words of Buddha, or Nagārjuna, then the meaning of that which "does not exist" is tailored to mean "does not truly exist," while the meaning of that which "does not not exist" is tailored to mean "does not not exist as total fiction." And so they patch their statements in various ways according to their own desires to conform. In truth, if they were to try and refute Buddha they would be labeled as evil—they'd be the ones with evil views—and they are afraid of that. But if they are able to refute a scholar of old Tibet they would be especially highly regarded as heroic and wise for making such a distinction. Conventions like "does not exist," "does not not exist," "expressionless," and 'elaboration-free" are neither more nor less in accord with Scripture and Collected Reasonings than they are with the excellent speech of the learned Tibetans of yore. Actually, the learned ones of old Tibet were traditional in their use of terms such as "ineffable" or "inconceivable." But still some people make refutations, calling them stupid or nihilistic. Others show in a manner of speaking a smidgen of respect and say, "Though they weren't quite right at least those accomplished scholars of old Tibet had their hearts and minds in the right place. It's not that they were totally wrong it's just that the finer points of the view had not yet emerged as explanations from the mouth of our own lord Highness." But if that were true the Conqueror himself must have not been totally wrong, but had his heart and mind in the right place, while his holy mouth made such expressions as "ineffable," "inconceivable," "inexpressible," and "transcendental" which, if utilized in their own right, are utilized as signs; and if wrongly utilized are still utilized as signs. Since Buddha only spoke like that then each of our own utilizations of what's been truly established upon the traditional peak of Mount Virtue are also only utilizations of signs. If one were to tailor that which "does not exist"—this is tailoring a sign. Having to establish such beautiful patches as these which had never before appeared was not Buddha's style: he never bothered with such trivial pursuits.

Therefore if the Tibetans of yore and Buddha are both to be refuted: better refute them equally. And if they were to be affirmed: better affirm them equally. Backbiting while fearing becoming the object of slander, manipulating the tongue in so many ways; please stop driving us all so crazy with deceit.

If there were to be a sincere attempt at analyzing the ultimate truth we must posit that it is only possible by being rid of the construct of intellect, the root of all decisions. Once such a mindset arises, were a great fear to rise with it, that fear would be toward the view of emptiness which is a fault. Other than that, were we to say, "Agreed upon thoughts of existence and non-existence, being and non-being, dirty and clean, good and bad, buddha and sentient being, high and low, hell and all the other realms, are interdependent and therefore not deceptive," that would simply be nullifying the need to refute based on assumptions and sentimentality. For once refuted there would be no other decision to be made than falling down into the view of nihilism. To say "Only that which is established as truth should be refuted" is just a dry statement to be deduced by other scholars with skill in elocution.

According to those scholars' traditional views it is normal for everyone to continue with the idea of "I," and since this is not actually self-grasping it is unacceptable to refute. To them, the manner in which self-ideation spontaneously arises is, for instance, when one person says, "You are a thief," the other would instinctively reply, "How could 'I' be a thief?" They also say, "The 'I' that arises out of the need to be alone is a spontaneous form of self-ideation."

Were it so that the ordinary idea of 'I' is valid, then once "You are a thief" had been expressed; with the idea of 'I' being roused, and its validity confirmed, wouldn't such an establishment only lead to ideology? It must, because if a person were to express, "Buddha is not a source of refuge," then how could the instinctive response, "How could he not be a source of refuge?" also not be regarded as ideological? Similarly, when someone says "This is not a vase," if it were not a vase, what else is there to say? But if one's intellect decides that it is a vase, then how could that be a valid basis for settling on the true existence of the vase? According to some scholars' traditional views a thought that is not so very strong is considered valid and once it gets just a little bit stronger it shifts in the wind to become something truly existent. Amazing!

"Most important to comprehend is the object of refutation, conceptual views," is a statement famous as the air in all our mouths. The truth from the holy mouth of our lord Highness would state, "Prior to non-conceptual emptiness a merely existing thing is impossible to differentiate from that which is truly and especially existential and, similarly, one surely cannot differentiate that which is truly non-existent from that which is merely non-existent," and since he also said that this is the ultimate reason there appears to be nothing in common between the Consequentialist and Mind-Only factions, then besides establishing the truth on top of the non-conceptual view how else could anything possibly be understood at all? And that being so, how can mind be relied upon to properly identify the object of refutation?

Then, if some scholars were to give rise to the valid ideation "There is a vase," then at the very same time they must be giving rise to the ideology "That vase is truly established," so they say "It is difficult to comprehend each of these things individually."

Nevertheless, there are two objects to be identified: that object of valid cognition, which is best for attaining buddhahood; and the object of ideology, which is the root of all faults. The fact that the two are one and the same is the most amazing reason why no one can grasp each of their individual aspects. Having arrived at one; how can it discern the other? Should both be refuted equally? How could the two possibly be distinguished?

"This is daybreak," would be a valid thought. "I am binding my sash" would also be a valid thought. Similarly, if "I drink tea," "I eat roasted barley flour" and others are all valid thoughts—each in their own right—and if not one of them that arises within a single day is refuted, then when would we ever rise to the occasion and call them ideologies, objects of refutation? Having been familiarized with such ideological thoughts since beginningless time, and taking them on—day in and day out—if even one or two were not allowed to arise that would be most amazing! 

What is this supposed to mean? Since the very beginning we've been brainwashed. For example: say your father is a brahman, and he is also a professor, and you see him coming. The very first thought that arises is this: "My father is coming." Other than that, thinking "The professor is coming" or "The brahman is coming" does not arise: thus is it said in the treatises on valid cognition. As for our own ideological way of thinking: having been familiarized with it since beginningless time the first thought roused at the moment of seeing a vase is that of the true and definitive existence of the vase. Then, philosophizing on the object of refutation, that which is to be particularly refuted is any reason for its true existence: thus the vase must be refuted, the pillar must be refuted, existence must be refuted, non-existence must be refuted. So, apart from the vase that's just sitting there, there is the notion of a truly established vase. What other angle is there to refute? This manner of philosophizing did not die with the scholars of old Tibet. Accomplished scholars within our own tradition, the Reformers, smelted their own experience and clarified their minds too. For example: Precious Graybeard being content with unadulterated appearance was of a mind to refute the need for seeking out horns on rabbits in the first place. The little bit that he said may not have been satisfactor; but he, Sky Plain's Lamp of Teachings, said the very same thing as our Great Pandit, Victory Banner Good Smarts.

Some people are afraid that if they use reason to refute the vase, the pillar, and others would give rise to the nihilistic view that nothing exists; but that's just meaningless, mental taxation. This vase as it were seen directly in front to a nihilist would be thought of as perpetually non-existent; and yet somehow it is produced for ordinary, individual beings!

Had a thought like that been produced, that the vase is something to be seen and touched, only objectifies the vase as something that appears to "I."The same appearance, but with the thought of its perpetual non-existence, is equally vase-affirming because the thought is the same: appearance and appearance void of grasping are both empty appearance and, as such, are grouped the same in the Middle Way. So how could that be nihilistic?

In brief, the thought of a vase being perpetually non-existent at the same time it is objectified by the eye is a spontaneously arising, illusion-like ideation. Where is the pain of having fallen into nihilism?

The mind that just cannot decide
Settles on consciousness as meets the eye
This yellow hatted scholar will study no more
What else would be illusory ideals

For example: when gold, clods of earth and vegetation are equally placed within a roaring fire the flammable things are burned and the non-flammable things are left behind. Philosophizing that all appearances are to be refuted without any special differentiation; then ascertaining a corpus of illusory things that leave a trace and straightaway separating them through an angle of correlative arising that allows for illusions: how could one possibly claim that harm cannot be advanced through reason?

Were one to inquire, "Conventions and valid establishments, you say, are not to be accepted, yet how is it you still have trust in correlative arising?" Well, generally speaking, that which is to be established through valid cognition is coarse, totofictional appearance which itself must be conveyed in minute detail. On account of its vastness, scholars have lumped it all into a single field of study called "three modes of reason"¹¹ which necessarily contains some special objects of ignorance, or totally conceptualized characteristics. This is a vast study which has been clearly conveyed through the reasoning and sophistry of scholars. Whether or not an effort is made to convey through reasoning that certain things established as valid are trustworthy, undeceiving, and incorruptible; totofictional consciousness that naturally arises within the continuum of all six families is pigeonholed with no other place to go. If a boy's hand comes in contact with fire and he says "Ouch" we accept that word as trustworthy and non-deceptive. If the father reprimands the boy with "Fire burns, your hand is flesh, why would it not be hot when your hand touches it?" then this would be the traditional manner of validation according to scripture and reason. Therefore since whatever exists—earth, stones, mountains, crags—are not going to simply vanish, it would also be meaningless for Three Jewels, cause and effect, and correlative arising to disappear. If the necessary appearances vanish first and the unnecessary appearances go later, then how does this suit the inferior natures of individual beings who lack religion?

Eventually, once one reaches the level of our elders, mantrikas of yore—that which they called "extinction of phenomena, transcendence of mind"—where earth, stones, correlative arising, Three Jewels, and so on; total fictions of good and bad, and everything in-between disappear at the root. Suffice it to think, reasonable or not, that wisdom body and wisdom mind would have been united, the two truths united, good and bad united, virtue and sin and so much more would have been united! Then, however much there is for the wisdom eye to see in its complete knowledge of all those hundreds of thousands of objects and their parts the wisdom eye sees completely as a single essence within the mind. 

Generally speaking, as individual, living beings, we have trust in things we like, we have trust in things we don't like, and worthless trust. Though there are many kinds of trust there is none greater than the natural trust in basic appearance. That which we call trust is involuntary; it's the force of experience that leads it into realms of hope and habitual objectification.

Though no one would say that the appearances in a dream are to be established as valid truths, still we find it necessary to trust those appearances through the involuntary feelings of happiness, despair, fear and terror as they arise in any given dream. For example: if one were to analyze with the three modes of logic while falling from a mountain peak into the abyss of a great rift while dreaming, then nothing but death would come of it. And yet for some reason, once having fallen, one still comes back to life. Then again, flying in the sky, if analyzed with logic is untenable just like all the other appearances. And yet when one is falling down there is fear and terror and while one is flying there is proliferate joy. That all these temporary experiences of mind arise is undeniable. In brief, as a fish is at home in water; when drowning a human being is afraid. These are involuntary reactions on the parts of fish and human beings and neither can deny their own peculiar trust in water.

Therefore, regarding our own, uncommon system of Consequentialism in which one person's self-identification is to be distinguished from the other's in debate, the individuals who have not turned away from dualistic fixation are those who take a position. They are the ones who make claims based on the self-identifications of others. For the yogi, though, the entire range of thought and mode of appearance for those individual beings is nothing to claim, being one in the comprehensive reality of yoga. The Consequentialist position, then, is not to manufacture one's own meaning but to be free from controversy and—all things being equal—abide in the state of freedom from expression. As a respondent, though, with an argument based on scripture and reason one casts off whatever claim could possibly be made and responds only in terms that would negate it. According to this approach there is no place to maintain such things as words, sounds, and especially the insider logics of sophists.

Briefly, to summarize, to state from the depths of the heart that the earth exists is a claim according to one's own tradition. To say "the earth exists" is involuntary insofar as so many others claim the same. The One Gone Thus never said to sit under the tree of enlightenment for a week without closing your eyes: that was his own tradition. But on account of those conceptual views of Four Noble Truths; that he turned the wheel of Law is a claim establishing his powerful compassion for the self-ideologies of others. This is understood not only as Consequentialist, but as the principal of the provisional and definitive meaning (the two truths) without being different at all from other schools. As it says in Total Commentary: 

Thus being endowed with equanimity
The great elephant's eyes are even set
Gazing in the course of worldly play ¹²

The way in which the Conqueror explained Dharma was according to external reality with a manner of speech very clearly in common with the Indian commentaries.

Each and every person thinks in two ways, maintains their position in two ways, and explains themselves in two ways: identifying with themselves and identifying with others. Of all manner of appearance of buddhas and sentient beings, and of all manner of explanations, would anyone trust if it were so neatly wrapped up in a single thought and jingle?

A clear sign of the institutionalization of today's religion is the fear that its adherents have of losing face. But for the Consequentialist there is no other response necessary than this: have no response. Responding with "I have no response" makes for a comeback that's both comical and ironic.

Entrusting the three modes of logic as the basis of reason in the conceptual thoughts of individual living beings is good if it is employed skillfully toward its own self-dissolution. But if it is used as a tool to harm the view of "having no response," then by no means will it facilitate the entrance into the sphere of reality. Master Dignāga already said it so clearly in Compendium of All Validities.¹³

Duality: objects of consciousness exist
Or not; validated views make fiction or fact
One is false, another fabricated source, once seen
What's valid and conventional come dismay

Duality: the world turns and presents itself
Traditions of tenets and analytical thought
A single root taps through it all, once seen
What's valid and conventional come dismay

Duality: what appears to mind's illusory
Certainly a character is meaningf'lly made
One is great if true, falsity too, once seen
What's valid and conventional come dismay

Duality: the proponent hides a mountain of faults
The needle within's what respondent seeks out
One conquers the other each in every turn, once seen
What's valid and conventional come dismay

Duality: refutable existents go unobserved
Non-existents never seen are gone before they begin
This tenet also naturally dissolves, once seen
What's valid and conventional come dismay

Duality: dogmatic attachment to name-only friends
Friends are so helpful and valid in their benefit
There's nothing so special about rousing wanton lust
What's valid and conventional come dismay

Duality: sworn enemies rouse their rivalries
It's valid the enemy is out to do harm
Wrath and hate have no difference between, having seen
What's valid and conventional come dismay

Direct perception bears stereotypes
Analyzing perception is mere inference
The child is judge of the father here
What's valid and conventional come dismay

Logical analysis depends on Charioteers
The power of their reason's what makes them "Great"
Whom is there to follow, having decided for oneself?
Whom is there to worship if one can't decide?

Perfect reason, definite meaning in scripture found
Definitive and provisional are perfectly revealed
Already having reason, what truth is there seek?
Without having reason, how could truth be found? 

Since Maitreyanātha was seen a female dog
Spontaneous non-thought forsakes the intellect
Contrarywise to masters and their centrist views
Forsake intelligencia, credentials too

For the folk who follow common sense
Ideology would be the cause of their decline
Scholars who follow common sense
Discover ideology as paradise

Existential or not, fiction or fact
This world is full of the clamor of debate
What's seen every day becomes objectified
Perpetual habits only seem to be real

Whatever is a joy to the masses is true
Multitudes in harmony will follow the rules
But within each person's a discordant view
A vague hope backed by adamant Word 

They hope in the end their row is canonized
They hope a thousand dumb scholars toe their line

Saying "Thus it is true that this should not confuse"
Proclaiming such a truth is reverence to oneself
An exponential joy in concordant crowds 
Though shameful to know one's crossed the line

The nations of beings, six unrelated families
Where ten want one thing and a hundred something else
Where what's seen by humans is invisible to gods
Who's to say what's valid and true, and who decides the laws?

Refining knowledge, one wears out their life
When delusion's what's become of the master's mind
It appears the world's an idiocracy
Confused, invested in terminology

Whatever one needs, whatever's good, all gates
Arisen of mind are picked apart to validate
In an illusory city on an empty plain 
A mirage, how lucky, this heap of gems

So much ado over one little face
Ado once more over a looking glass
Objects of consciousness, unstable lookalikes
Eventually they will pass forever in the end

No one will grok this treatise, or so I think
It's a needle in a haystack, or so I think
Direct perception's in the palm of my hand, I think
Appearance can't possibly be delusion, I think

The root of being is nothing to be sought, or so I think
The peak of non-being is something to be seen, or so I think
A seed of truth was born that turned out to unfurl a farce
Once having noticed the fiction the truth revealed

Thus it is also said.

Translated from Tibetan by StevenRAJ

Scholarly Notes

1. The lines attributed to Āryadeva's Four Hundred Stanzas (Catuḥśataka. Indian Treatise. 103: 60-479) appear to be, rather, a paraphrased citation from Nagārjuna's Sixty Lines of Reason (Yuktiṣaṣṭikākārika. Ibid. 96: 42), who himself appears to be paraphrasing Buddha.
   Now this would be a fine time to convey a point or two on the scriptural tradition of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Nagārjuna is considered a "Charioteer," or founder of the tradition of metaphysics. Those who follow in the commentarial tradition, namely Āryadeva and Candrakīrti, cite him in support their own arguments. And the Tibetans quote the same in their own commentarial traditions. Vast swaths of canonical works would have been resounded and memorized in the monastic schools. Earnest Priest's citations are likely from memory and thus are subject to slight scholarly inconsistencies.
2. Commentary on 400 Stanzas: The Yogic Activity of Spiritual Heroes (Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśakaṭīkā. Indian Treatise. 103: 146-147)
3. The work mentioned here is so vague only two syllables are used for a citation: "'jug 'grel," or Entrance. Technically, Candrakīrti wrote an "Entrance" and he also wrote several "Commentaries" but not a "Commentary on the Entrance..."  The point comes across, however, in the following centuries of commentarial banter up to the pious voices of the present day, "Actually..."
4. The Nature of All Phenomena, Totally Radiant Equality, King of Concentration (Samādhirāja Sūtra. Buddha Word. 55: 52). 
5. To elaborate: "Ones Gone to Bliss, without exception, have taken account of every particle of adorning gems in the realms that are their buddhafields. On account of that fortune of those gone to holy and supreme enlightenment, well, this is your secret and it would be disrespectful of me to divulge." Entrance to The Middle Way (Madhyamakāvatāra. Indian Treatise. 102: 436).
6. For instance, The Licchavi, Vimalakīrti, said: "Śāriputra, Ones Gone Thus and Spiritual Heroes dwell in what we call "Inconceivable Liberation." The Spiritual Hero who abides in this Inconceivable Liberation places the king of mountains, Mount Meru, so lofty, so great, so noble, and so free, within a mustard seed—without voiding the productive capability of the mustard seed, and without cramping the mountain—it's done the way they show. The gods on the mountains of the Four Great Kings, the thirty-three gods, even some of us don't know how they do it. Miraculous powers discipline those living beings who see and understand the king of mountains, Mount Meru, being placed in a mustard seed. And that, Śāriputra, is the entrance into the realm of the Inconceivable Liberation of Spiritual Heroes." (Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra. Buddha Word. 60: 410.)
7. Madhyamakāvatāra. Indian Treatise. 102: 437.
8. Paraphrased from Sons of Religion: The Succession of Births of OurTeacher of Drom, Source of Victory ('brom ston pa rgyal ba'i 'byung gnas kyi skyes rabs bka' gdams bu chos) by Atisha (Collected Works. 428) The Book of Scriptural Advisors (bka' damgs glegs bam) is an un-standardized bundle of liberation stories, works, and collected conversations from the lineage of Scriptural Advisors, as founded by the Indian Buddhist, Lord Atisha, and propagated by his main disciple, Teacher of Drom. The lineage gradually diffused and its teachings were assimilated into the other major schools of Tibet.
9. Paraphrased from Chapter on Arya Kaśyapa (Kaśyapaparivarta-Sūtra), from The Noble Eight Thousand-fold Series of Religion: The Great Jewel Heap (Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra). Rather than "inconceivable", the Scripture reads "unanalyzable". Buddha Word. 44: 261.
10. Although placing this quatrain in The Great Jewel Heap puts it close to the previous citation, it's actually paraphrased from King of Concentration: Chapter 9: "Bearing with Profound Religion". Again, the last word of the citation is paraphrased. Scripture literally refers to the stoppage of suffering, while Priest seems to embellish on the mofif of debate (Samādhirāja Sūtra. Buddha Word. 55: 53.)
11. Three modes of reason: 1) The property of the subject: the reason must be a property of the subject; 2) The forward pervasion: the reason is completely pervaded by the predicate; 3) The counter pervasion: the negative of the predicate is completely pervaded by the negative of the reason.
12. Paraphrased from Root Verses of Total Commentary on Valid Cognition. Here is the verse translated from the Scripture itself, including the third verse. "Thus being endowed with equanimity // The great elephant's eyes are even set // To see the heart of matter: he alone // Has set his gaze to assess this worldly play." Dharmakīrti. Pramāṇavārttikakārika. (Indian Treatise. 174: 252.)
13. Dignāga. Pramāṇasamuccaya. (Indian Treatise. 174: 1-27.) The seminal sourcebook of Buddhist epistemology in which there are two types of knowledge: direct perception and inference. Earnest Priest Lord of Law Scholar proceeds to offer his take on the topic in verse.

Tibetan Source Text

Ornament of Nagārjuna's Thought: Essential Key Points on the Middle Way, A Bundle of Fine Explanations (dbu ma'i zab gnad snying por dril ba'i legs bshad klu sgrub dgongs rgyan zhes bya ba bzhugs so). Collected Works. 2: 61-86.

This treatise comprises the first third of the work, Ornament of Nagārjuna's Thought. The title translated here comes from Gnostic Ocean's hagiography of Priest in which he refers to this manuscript as "the Great Elephant paperback." Collected Works. 217.

Tibetan Bibliography

Canonical: Buddha Word

bka' 'gyur (sde dge par phud): 103 Volumes: the sde-dge mtshal-par bka'-'gyur : a facsimile edition of the 18th century redaction of si-tu chos-kyi-'byun-gnas prepared under the direction of h.h. the 16th rgyal-dban karma-pa: Dege Kangyur. Facsimile of the parpud or 'first fruit' printing of the 1733 blocks, meaning it was pressed before later changes were made to the blocks. Produced under the patronage of the Dege King Tenpa Tsering. Chief editor was Palpung Tai Situ Chokyi Jungne in 1733. One of the first editions of the Tibetan canon to be widely distributed, and is almost universally praised for its clarity. Editors in India made numerous changes in preparation for this edition, printed 1976-1979.

Canonical: Indian Treatise

bstan 'gyur (sde dge): 213 Volumes: Dege Tengyur. Produced in 1737-1744 under the patronage of the Dege King Tenpa Tsering. Edited by Shuchen Tsultrim Rinchen. Facsimile was published in India in 1982-1985 as a part of Karmapa 16 Rangchung Rikpai Dorje's (1924-1981) memorial ceremonies.

Collected Works

dge 'dun chos 'phel. gsung 'bum/_dge 'dun chos 'phel. [khreng tu'u]: si khron dpe skrun tshogs pa; si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang , 2009.

Atiśa Dīpaṃkara Śrījñāna. gsung 'bum/_ a ti sha/. pe cin/: krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang /, 2006. dpal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib 'jug khang nas bsgrigs. bka' gdams dpe dkon gces btus/ Collected Works by Atisha. Diplomatic edition. Based upon manuscripts found at Drepung and published in the Kadam sereies.

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